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Convergence in Cryptocurrency Prices?  




Do we observe convergence between cryptocurrencies over time? This study explores this question 
with eight major cryptocurrencies in circulation and posits a framework to evaluate whether shifts 
in their market microstructures drive convergence. Three main findings emerge. First, convergence 
can emerge between cryptocurrencies with distinct technological functions and classifications. 
Second, market microstructure behavior drives convergence. Third, estimated transition paths 
show tighter convergence for half of our sampled cryptocurrencies during the time when the 
Chicago Board of Exchange (CBOE) introduced bitcoin futures contracts. 
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Convergence in Cryptocurrency Prices?  




With the emergence of cryptocurrencies, certain studies have investigated the market 
efficiency of the cryptocurrency market (Tran and Leirvik 2019; 2020, Hu et al. 2019, and citations 
therein).  As proposed by Fama (1970; 1991), the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) implies that all available information is reflected in the price of a security.  As an alternative 
to the static view of the EMH, Lo (2004) argues through the adaptive market hypothesis (AMH) 
that market efficiency evolves over time since markets are not always rational and its participants 
respond to changes in the aggregate economic environment.  Tran and Leirvik (201; 2020) and Hu 
et al. (2019) note the cryptocurrency market has exhibited long periods of inefficiency with more 
recent evidence suggesting increased efficiency.  As such, several studies have explored aspects 
pertaining to the cryptocurrency market, such as volatility spillover effects (Omane-Adjepong and 
Alagidede, 2019; and references therein), comovements of cryptocurrency prices and their 
volatility (Katsiampa et al. 2019; Omane-Adjepong et al. 2019, and references therein), the 
interconnectedness among cryptocurrency prices and exchanges (Sifat et al. 2019; Ji et al. 2020; 
and references therein), along with contagion, herding behavior, and competition within the 
cryptocurrency market (Antonakakis et al. 2019; Bouri et al. 2019; Fernandez-Villaverde and 
Sanches, 2019; and references therein).  
We extend this literature on the behavior of cryptocurrency markets using the Phillips and 
Sul (2007) approach to examine convergence behavior of cryptocurrency prices.   Drawing upon 
the early work of Chamberlin and Rothschild (1983) and Connor and Korajczyk (1986; 1988) with 
respect to common factors in asset pricing models, Phillips and Sul (2007) demonstrate that a time 




factor structure.1 Specific to cryptocurrency prices, the Phillips and Sul (2007) approach captures 
the evolution of individual cryptocurrency prices in relation to the common component of 
cryptocurrency prices and an idiosyncratic component, both of which are time-varying.  In 
addition, the Phillips and Sul (2007) modeling approach offers several advantages.  First, the 
Phillips and Sul (2007) approach allows for different time paths as well as individual 
heterogeneity, unlike the traditional convergence models (β- and σ-convergence) that assume 
homogeneous characteristics.  Second, this approach allows for the endogenous determination of 
convergence clubs.  Third, unlike conventional unit root and cointegration tests, the Phillips and 
Sul (2007) approach does not impose any particular assumption concerning trend stationarity or 
stochastic non-stationarity, since it is robust to heterogeneity and the stationarity properties of the 
variable in question. 
In this context, we examine eight major cryptocurrencies in circulation (Bitcoin, Dash, 
DigiByte, Dogecoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, NEM, and XRP). These sampled cryptocurrencies 
presently constitute over 80% of the total market capitalization of all the digital currencies in 
circulation.2  In addition to exploring the overall panel convergence for the eight cryptocurrency 
prices, we implement the convergence clustering algorithm of Phillips and Sul (2007) to determine 
the existence of convergence clubs within the eight cryptocurrencies.  Next, we investigate the 
extent to which cryptocurrencies' market microstructure characteristics explain convergence clubs 
using an order logit model. The microstructure characteristics include range volatilities, trading 
volumes, market capitalizations (to proxy for size), number of unique addresses (to proxy for the 
 
1 Within the context of the multiple factor model of stock prices set forth by Menzly et al. (2002), Phillips and Sul 
(2007) show that time varying multiple common factors can be embedded into a time varying single factor framework, 
see Phillips and Sul (2007, pp. 177-178). 
 
2 This is noteworthy given that there are almost 2,400 cryptocurrencies in total (see coinmarketcap.com). The eight 




number of users), and mining fees (Akcora et al., 2018; Chaim and Laurini, 2018; Dyhrberg et al., 
2018; Vliet, 2018). While range volatility reflects uncertainty about future price changes, trading 
volume arises from the flow of news and information into the market. Market capitalization reflects 
size and is generally positively associated with liquidity conditions. The number of addresses 
reveal network value and, finally, mining fees reflect costs and usage for verifying transactions on 
the blockchain. 
 The results reveal the absence of overall panel convergence among the eight 
cryptocurrency prices. Rather, they show three distinct convergence clubs. The findings from the 
order logit model reveal that range volatility, market capitalization, and mining fees have a positive 
and statistically significant impact on convergence behavior, whereas trading volume and 
addresses each yield a negative and statistically significant influence. These results are important 
for the following reasons. First, they demonstrate that convergence clubs can emerge among our 
sampled cryptocurrencies that do not correspond with current technology classifications (or 
groupings) of cryptocurrencies. Specifically, cryptocurrencies are presently classified as either 
currencies, protocols, or decentralized applications (dApps) based on what their primary function 
is, as well as their position within the blockchain technology stack.3 Second, there is heterogeneity 
in the role by which various microstructure characteristics play in cryptocurrencies' convergence 
behaviors. While some microstructure variables may have a positive effect on convergence (range 
volatility, market capitalization, and mining fees), others have a negative effect (trading volume 
and number of addresses). [Insert anything regarding the CBOE result?] 
 
3 Corbet et al. (2017) discuss in detail what these technology classifications mean and test whether monetary policy 
can have a differing effect on each of the cryptocurrencies based on their classification. Deloitte provides an 






 Section 2 describes the data with the methodology and results reported in Section 3.  
Concluding remarks are given in Section 4. 
 
2. Data 
The analysis requires a sufficient time series on the closing prices of cryptocurrencies in 
US dollars. For this purpose, we utilize daily data (which includes weekends) for eight 
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Dash, DigiByte, Dogecoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, NEM, XRP) spanning 
the time period August 7, 2015 to May 1, 2020, obtained from CoinMarketCap.4 We focus on 
eight cryptocurrency closing prices and include a broad set of microstructure variables: range 
volatility, calculated from high and low prices as ln(High) − ln(Low), trading volume, market 
capitalization, number of unique addresses, and mining fees. These variables represent 
fundamental characteristics pertaining to cryptocurrencies' value, risk, and the overall health of 
their microstructure (Easley, 2019). Table 1 offers summary statistics, while Figure 1 graphically 
depicts the time series behavior of cryptocurrency closing prices. In terms of the statistics, we can 
clearly observe the dominance of Bitcoin, not only in terms of closing prices, but also in terms of 
displaying higher price volatility. This cryptocurrency also exhibits the highest volume of 
transactions across all cryptocurrencies, while it is also characterized by the highest market 
capitalization. Moreover, in terms of the skewness statistics, not only in terms of closing prices, 
but also in terms of the remaining measures, all cryptocurrencies are characterized by the presence 
of asymmetries, and more specifically are positively skewed. Finally, in terms of the kurtosis 
 
4 CoinMarketCap.com provides historical opening, high, low and closing prices, as well as trade volume and market capitalization 
data, for all the cryptocurrencies in circulation. This source is advantageous to use since the price data are a volume-weighted 





metric, the distribution of the respective cryptocurrencies cannot be characterized as symmetric, 
since all measures are far from the normal distribution. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
3. Methodology and Results 
The Phillips and Sul (2007) modelling approach tests whether there is convergence with 
respect to the heterogeneous time-varying idiosyncratic components after controlling for a 
common growth component among the cryptocurrency prices that share the same convergence 
pattern.5    Specifically, the Phillips-Sul approach utilizes a time-varying common factor defined 
as:  
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖             (1) 
where i = 1, …, N and t = 1, …, T.  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents cryptocurrency closing prices.  The 
cryptocurrency closing prices, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. are comprised of a common component, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 , and an idiosyncratic 
component, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, both of which are time-varying.  Note the idiosyncratic component, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,  is a 
measure of the distance between 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and the common component, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 .  Phillips and Sul (2007) 











         (2) 
Equation (2) measures the loading coefficient, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, relative to the panel average, hence the 
transition path for closing prices of cryptocurrency i relative to the panel average.  In the event the 
factor loadings, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , converge to a constant, 𝛿𝛿, then the cross-sectional mean of the relative 
 
5 The Phillips-Sul approach does not rely on any assumptions regarding the stationarity of the variables, as in the case 
for tests of stochastic convergence.  Note that prior to the implementation of the Phillips-Sul convergence approach, 
the trend component of the respective time series for cryptocurrency closing prices is extracted using the Hodrick and 





transition path for cryptocurrency i, ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , converges to unity and the cross-sectional variation, 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖, 




∑ (ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 1)2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 → 0         (3) 
The semi-parametric form of 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is presented as: 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿(𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼
          (4) 
where δi is fixed; ξit ~ iid(0,1) varies across the closing prices of cryptocurrencies i = 1, 2, …, N;  
σi is an idiosyncratic scale parameter;  L(t) is a slow varying function where L(t)→∞ and t→∞; 
and α represents the decay rate (i.e. speed of convergence).  Equation (4) states that 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 converges 
to δi for α ≥ 0.  Therefore, the null hypothesis of convergence is 𝐻𝐻0: 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿 and α ≥ 0 against the 
alternative hypothesis 𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴: 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝛿𝛿 for some i and/or α < 0. 
 In accordance with Phillips and Sul (2007), we set L(t) = logt in the decay model, so the 
empirical log t regression can be used to test for convergence and the implementation of the 
clustering algorithm to determine convergence clubs as follows: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �𝐻𝐻1
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖
� − 2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖       (5) 
for t = rT, rT+1, …, T where r > 0 set on the interval [0.2, 0.3].  For b� = 2α, the null hypothesis is 
considered a one-sided test of  b� ≥ 0 against b� < 0.6  To address estimates from Equation (5) that 
may be weakly time-dependent, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
are employed in the least squares estimates of 𝑏𝑏�.    
The Phillips and Sul (2007) procedure uses a clustering algorithm to identify convergence 
clubs as follows:  (1) order the N cryptocurrencies in the panel using the final values of closing 
prices for the respective cryptocurrencies; (2) starting from the highest-order cryptocurrency in 
 




terms of closing prices, sequentially estimate Equation (5) on the k highest member 
cryptocurrencies to identify a core group using the cut-off point criterion: 𝑘𝑘∗ = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘�𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏�𝑘𝑘�, 
subject to  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘�𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏�𝑘𝑘� > 1.65, for k = 2, 3, …N; (3) add one cryptocurrency at a time from the 
remaining cryptocurrencies to the core group, and re-estimate Equation (5) using the sign criterion 
(b� ≥ 0) to determine whether to include a cryptocurrency to the core group; and (4) repeat the 
above steps iteratively for the remaining cryptocurrencies until convergence clubs can no longer 
be formed.  As a result of this iterative approach, each club formed is associated with its own 
convergence path.7  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 reports the panel convergence results for cryptocurrency closing prices.8 In Panel 
A of Table 2 the full panel of eight cryptocurrency closing prices yields a t-statistic of -27.519, 
which rejects the null hypothesis of overall panel convergence.  As such, the clustering algorithm 
is used to identify distinct convergence clubs. The first club (Club 1) consists of Ethereum and 
Dash yielding a t-statistic of 1.329, which fails to reject the null hypothesis of convergence.  The 
second club (Club 2) is comprised of Litecoin and NEM with a t-statistic of 1.254, while the third 
club (Club 3) includes Bitcoin, XRP, Dogecoin, and Digibyte, with a t-statistic of 19.295. These 
results are important as they show how cryptocurrencies that have different technological 
classifications (see footnote 2 should be footnote 3?) can form clubs.  Panel A of Table 2 
classifies whether the cryptocurrencies are either currencies (C), protocols (P), or decentralized 
applications (dApps). Next, to address the possibility of over-estimating the number of clubs, tests 
for merging adjacent clubs in Panel B of Table 2 clearly reject the null hypothesis of clubs merging. 
 
7 Cryptocurrencies that fail to exhibit a convergence pattern are viewed as non-convergent. 
 




The transition paths for the respective convergence clubs are shown in Figures 2A, 2B and 
2C, respectively.9 The speed of convergence, α, varies across the convergence clubs with the 
cryptocurrency closing prices in Club 1 reaching the convergence reference point of 1 before either 
Clubs 2 or 3.  Club 3, which consists of Bitcoin, Digibyte, Dogecoin and XRP illustrate a tighter 
convergence during the time when the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) introduced 
Bitcoin futures. This is consistent with studies that demonstrate how Bitcoin futures contribute to 
informational efficiency (Akyildirim, 2019). 
[Insert Figures 2A, 2B and 2C here] 
Given the convergence clubs identified in Table 2, we explore the role of several 
microstructure variables in explaining the distinctive convergence clubs using an ordered logit 
model: 
yi∗ = Xiβ + εi           (6) 
where the dependent variable yi∗ is an ordinal value from 1 to 3; Xi represents the set of 
microstructure variables, and i = 1, 2, …, 8 cryptocurrencies. The column vector β contains the 
regression coefficients. In Table 3, we find the coefficients for range volatility, market 
capitalization, and mining fees are each positive and statistically significant, while the coefficients 
for trading volume and addresses are each negative and statistically significant.  
 This provides initial evidence for a clientele effect, whereby investors' buying and selling 
activity (trade volume) and the degree of network activity (addresses) stems from their unique 
needs, expectations or preferences. Give it has been shown that users may gravitate toward using 
a particular cryptocurrency for social reasons (Dodd, 2018), it is possible that usage and trading 
 
9 The transition paths illustrate the tendency of the cryptocurrency prices to converge or diverge from above or 




activity, based on such preferences, can act to segment cryptocurrencies from one another. Since 
market capitalization is positively related to liquidity, it is likely that the prices of cryptocurrencies 
with relatively larger liquidity adjust similarly with one another. This notion is consistent with the 
postulations of Liu and Timmermann (2013), who show that groups of high liquidity stocks should 
experience similar shifts in their price (thus an acceleration to convergence). Volatility is positively 
related to convergence since it causes volatility clustering across cryptocurrencies simultaneously. 
For example, Koutmos (2018) shows how bitcoin's volatility shocks can permeate across a range 
of cryptocurrencies. Finally, as mining fees decline over time, we expect to see further 
convergence in cryptocurrency price behaviors.  
 In terms of the size of our coefficients, a one-unit increase in range volatility, market 
capitalization, and mining fees each translate to an increased likelihood of joining Club 1 moving 
from Clubs 2 and 3, or Club 2 moving from Club 3, with these probabilities being 0.479, 0.488, 
and 0.203, respectively. In contrast, a one-unit increase in trading volume and addresses each lead 
to a decreased likelihood of joining Club 1 moving from Clubs 2 and 3, or Club 2 moving from 
Club 3, with these probabilities being 0.656 and 0.224, respectively. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
The market for cryptocurrencies has risen steadily over the last few years following the 
inception of Bitcoin. In this study, we explore the convergence behavior of eight major 
cryptocurrencies. We provide a framework for evaluating the role of microstructure variables serve 
in the convergence behavior of cryptocurrency closing prices. First, we show convergence is 




microstructure behavior drives convergence. Our results show initial support for a clientele effect 
in convergence behavior. We also show how the introduction of futures markets can cause 
convergence to shift among cryptocurrencies. From an econometric standpoint, our empirical 
approach is tractable and can accommodate a wide range of idiosyncratic or systematic variables 























Time Series Plots of Cryptocurrency Closing Prices 
 
 
   
 
      
 
     
 









Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
       
Bitcoin       
Price 4,714.63 3,966.83 210.49 19,497.40 0.60 -0.31 
Range volatility 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.49 2.69 13.19 
Trading volume 7.93E+10 1.11E+10 1.27E+07 7.42E+10 1.88E+00 3.52E+00 
Market cap. 8.17E+10 6.95E+10 3.06E+05 3.27E+11 5.34E-01 -5.82E-01 
# of addresses 6.44E+05 1.69E+05 2.53E+05 1.29E+06 3.33E-01 5.59E-01 
Mining fees 5.98E+05 1.72E+06 4.48E+03 2.14E+07 6.08E+00 4.29E+01 
       
Dash       
Price 151.95 213.53 2.06 1,550.85 2.76 9.12 
Range volatility 0.08 0.07 0.01 1.58 7.67 127.20 
Trading volume 1.59E+08 2.34E+08 1.84E+04 2.74E+09 3.11E+00 1.56E+01 
Market cap. 1.22E+09 1.67E+09 1.24E+07 1.20E+10 2.70E+00 8.81E+00 
# of addresses 4.19E+04 3.11E+04 5.28E+03 2.67E+05 1.20E+00 3.70E+00 
Mining fees 7.97E+02 1.71E+03 2.21E+00 1.94E+04 4.14E+00 2.14E+01 
       
DigiByte       
Price 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.13 2.63 10.72 
Range volatility 0.12 0.11 0.02 1.38 4.02 28.98 
Trading volume 4.89E+06 1.60E+07 2.20E+02 2.32E+08 8.21E+00 8.51E+01 
Market cap. 1.24E+08 1.54E+08 2.18E+05 1.23E+09 2.41E+00 9.28E+00 
# of addresses 1.96E+04 1.69E+05 1.81E+03 4.31E+06 2.07E+01 4.62E+02 
Mining fees 4.91E+00 1.43E+01 5.20E-04 2.25E+02 6.39E+00 5.83E+01 
       
Dogecoin       
Price 2.00E-03 2.00E-03 1.10E-04 0.02 1.97 7.47 
Range volatility 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.61 2.95 12.15 
Trading volume 2.65E+07 4.44E+07 1.67E+04 2.99E+08 2.70E+00 8.50E+00 
Market cap. 2.34E+08 2.27E+08 1.16E+07 1.93E+09 1.82E+00 6.61E+00 
# of addresses 4.85E+04 2.53E+04 1.34E+04 3.38E+05 1.91E+00 1.19E+01 
Mining fees 8.66E+01 1.10E+02 1.49E+00 1.41E+03 3.87E+00 2.92E+01 
       
Ethereum       
Price 202.55 234.85 0.44 1396.42 1.88 4.02 
Range volatility 0.08 0.07 0.01 1.37 4.96 60.23 
Trading volume 3.24E+09 4.80E+09 1.02E+05 2.81E+10 2.19E+00 5.30E+00 
Market cap. 2.03E+10 2.30E+10 3.22E+07 1.35E+11 1.79E+00 3.70E+00 
# of addresses 2.15E+05 3.18E+05 1.11E+03 7.16E+06 1.14E+01 1.96E+02 











Summary Statistics (Cont.) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
       
Litecoin       
Price 52.39 56.83 2.63 358.34 1.82 4.23 
Range volatility 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.54 2.93 13.70 
Trading volume 1.06E+09 1.55E+09 5.07E+05 7.55E+09 1.53E+00 1.30E+00 
Market cap. 3.03E+09 3.21E+09 1.11E+08 1.95E+10 1.59E+00 3.15E+00 
# of addresses 6.28E+04 6.02E+04 7.15E+03 6.02E+05 3.24E+00 1.76E+01 
Mining fees 3.15E+03 1.28E+04 3.75E+01 2.34E+05 1.03E+01 1.36E+02 
       
NEM       
Price 0.12 0.21 0.00 1.84 4.12 21.57 
Range volatility 0.10 0.09 0.01 1.10 2.98 16.76 
Trading volume 1.66E+07 2.80E+07 6.91E+01 3.32E+08 4.78E+00 3.52E+01 
Market cap. 1.04E+09 1.88E+09 7.71E+05 1.66E+10 4.12E+00 2.16E+01 
# of addresses 2.03E+03 3.19E+03 6.00E+00 6.41E+04 1.01E+01 1.57E+02 
Mining fees 7.91E+02 2.28E+03 4.90E-02 3.10E+04 6.39E+00 5.59E+01 
       
XRP       
Price 0.27 0.34 0.00 3.38 3.60 21.03 
Range volatility 0.07 0.08 0.00 1.19 4.77 38.81 
Trading volume 6.71E+08 1.03E+09 2.48E+04 9.42E+09 3.03E+00 1.45E+01 
Market cap. 1.07E+10 1.34E+10 1.37E+08 1.31E+11 3.45E+00 2.00E+01 
# of addresses 6.35E+03 1.09E+04 6.14E+02 2.32E+05 1.03E+01 1.58E+02 







Convergence Tests for Cryptocurrency Closing Prices 
 
Panel A:  Full Panel of Cryptocurrency Closing Prices (N = 8) 
Subgroup Cryptocurrencies b coefficient log t-statistic Convergence Speed, α 
Full sample 
Bitcoin (C), Ethereum (P), XRP 
(dApp), Litecoin (C), Dash (C), 




     
Club 1 Ethereum (P), Dash (C) 1.994 1.329 0.997 
     
Club 2 Litecoin (C), NEM (P) 0.208 1.254 0.104 
     
Club 3 Bitcoin (C), XRP (dApp), Dogecoin (C), DigiByte (P) 0.462 19.295 0.231 
Notes:  ***: p≤0.01, denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence. The parentheses indicate whether the 
cryptocurrency is classified as a currency (C), protocol (P), or decentralized application (dApp). 
 
 
Panel B:  Tests of merging clubs 
Merging clubs t-statistic p-value 
Club 1 + 2 6.836*** 0.00 
   
Club 2 + 3 7.105*** 0.00 

































Convergence Club 3 
 
Notes:  The vertical black dashed line corresponds to the date December 10, 2017, when the Chicago 





Order Logit Model Results 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
Range volatility 0.479*** 0.00 
Trading volume -0.656*** 0.00 
Market cap. 0.488*** 0.00 
# of addresses  -0.224** 0.02 
Mining fees 0.203** 0.03 
Pseudo R2 = 0.57 
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